The Hard Cases: When Divine Morality Confronts Human Reality
Exploring the Torah’s Hard Cases: Lessons on Justice, Mercy, and the Limits of Human Understanding Amid Conflict and Dependence.
In the previous essays, we established a framework for understanding how the Torah communicates moral truth across time. We explored the distinction between eternal divine morality and evolving human ethics,1 guided by meta-halakhic principles—the overarching moral principles that shape Jewish law. We saw how the Torah operates on two levels: moral duty (the minimum standards—do not steal) and moral aspiration (the higher calling—love your neighbor as yourself), both of which direct humanity toward greater justice and compassion.2
Now we apply this framework to the Torah’s most morally challenging passages. These are cases that seem to contradict the Torah’s own foundational principles. When faced with such tensions, we employ the traditional interpretive tools that have always guided Jewish textual analysis. As Rabbi Yehuda teaches: “One who translates a verse literally is a liar” (Kiddushin 49a).
We will examine six cases: the rebellious son, the beautiful captive woman, Amalek, the Canaanite nations, Hebrew slavery, and non-Jewish slavery. In each, we will see how the tools from our framework—meta-halakhic principles, the duty-aspiration distinction, and the recognition of internal tensions—reveal the Torah’s deeper moral teaching.
The Rebellious Son: When Law Becomes Teaching
The Ben Sorer U’moreh (rebellious son) confronts us with an apparent moral impossibility. A thirteen-year-old boy steals money to buy meat and wine and disobeys his parents. For this, he faces death by stoning, with the text anticipating his future escalation to murder and robbery.3
This violates fundamental Jewish principles, including the presumption of innocence, proportional punishment, and, most troubling, the possibility of Teshuvah (repentance)—a central tenet of Jewish thought.4 It punishes someone not for what he has done, but for what he might do.5
These internal tensions signal that interpretation is required. The Talmudic analysis reveals the Torah’s pedagogical method. Using traditional interpretive tools, the Sages discovered that this law’s technical requirements make execution virtually impossible. Both parents must be identical in height, voice, and appearance. Both parents must want to prosecute—if they forgive him or hold out hope for change, the case cannot proceed.6 The son must consume precise amounts of specific foods in particular ways. The Talmud concludes that this case never happened and perhaps was never meant to be implemented.7
This reflects Judaism’s broader approach to capital punishment, where education—not punishment—is the goal. A court executing once in seventy years was called “murderous.” Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva declared that had they served on the Sanhedrin, no one would ever have been executed.8 The Talmud explains: “drosh v’kabel sakhar” expound and receive reward. The value lies in learning from it, in education.9
The law forces examination of fundamental questions: What is the parental role in moral education? How do small transgressions lead to larger ones? By making execution practically impossible through its technical requirements, the Torah transforms what appears to be a capital case into an extended meditation on the centrality of education in preventing moral decay. It teaches that early intervention, proper parenting, and moral guidance are paramount—far more important than any punishment could ever be.10
While the rebellious son demonstrates the Torah’s use of legal form for moral education, the captive woman case confronts the moral collapse of warfare, striving to preserve human dignity even in chaos.
The Beautiful Captive Woman: Restraint Within War’s Chaos
War has always created conditions where sexual exploitation thrives. In the Vietnam War—within living memory—many Vietnamese women entered relationships with U.S. soldiers as survival strategies for food, shelter, or protection.11 Soldiers held overwhelming power. Left unchecked, this dynamic devolved into rape, prostitution, and systemic abuse, stripping women of humanity and reducing men to predators. These patterns recurred from World War II to Bosnia and Rwanda.12
The Torah confronts this reality in the commandment of Eshet Yefat To’ar (the beautiful captive woman). This is not a license but a limitation. The law does not permit what would otherwise be forbidden—it regulates what human weakness might attempt in war’s chaos, creating protective minimums where dignity is most endangered.13 The soldier may not simply take or discard the woman. He must bring her home, give her time to mourn her family, and remove the artificial beautification of wartime. The mourning period serves to sober desire and allow reflection, with time and humanity.14
Jeremiah captures this desperate dynamic: “And you, O plundered one, what will you do? Though you dress in scarlet, though you deck yourself with gold ornaments, though you enlarge your eyes with paint, in vain you beautify yourself. Your lovers despise you; they seek your life” (Jer 4:30).15
Through these measures, the Torah discourages exploitation while preserving the humanity of both parties, designed to dampen impulse and restore human recognition. The Torah does not glorify this; it limits it. It does not encourage it; it disciplines it. In doing so, it demonstrates ethical awareness of human weakness in war, offering structure that preserves dignity in circumstances where it is most endangered.
The captive woman addresses warfare’s impact on individual dignity. But warfare also raises questions about collective identity and inherited enmity. Can hatred pass from generation to generation? Should it? Amalek and the Canaanite nations force us to grapple with these questions—but in critically different ways.
Amalek: Memory, Not Battlefield
We have two distinct commandments regarding Amalek: to fight them and to remember them.16 This distinction is crucial. The fighting commandment follows the same rules of engagement as any other nation—we must first call for peace and offer acceptance if they adopt the seven Noahide laws. There was no categorical imperative to destroy them. To the contrary, even here, peace was preferable.17
Amalek attacked the Israelites when they were “weary and weak,” focusing on those “lagging behind”—the elderly, the sick, the vulnerable. Those who are weak pose no danger.18 This was irrational, groundless hatred. Unlike Egypt’s oppression, which had rational motivations rooted in demographic fears and economic exploitation, Amalek’s attack served no strategic purpose. It was pure predation—hatred that cannot be reasoned with because it lacks a rational foundation.19
The Historical Record and Legal Reality
Did we actually wipe the Amalekites out? The biblical record suggests otherwise. Years after King Saul was commanded to annihilate them, when the Amalekites raided David’s territory, he inquired of God what to do.20 Professor Rabbi Reuven Kimelman notes: “Evidently, there was no recourse to any standing order to kill Amalek. Indeed, nothing is made of the fact that they are Amalekites... David’s counterattack sought only to recoup his own. Amalekites who fled are left alone.” There was no condemnation of David for not slaying Amalek.21
The Sochatchover Rebbe clarifies: “Fathers shall not die for [the sins of their] children, nor shall children die for [the sins of their] fathers’ (Deuteronomy 24:16)... If they have repented and accepted the seven [Noahide] commandments, which means that they do not persist in their ancestor’s deeds, they should not be punished for their iniquities.”22
Maimonides ruled that the physical command applied only if the Amalekites refused peace and rejected the seven Noahide laws. He stated the command was no longer applicable since Sennacherib’s resettlements made ethnic identification impossible23. Indeed, the Talmud records: “Haman’s descendants studied Torah in Bnei Brak.”24
The Power of Remembrance
The real distinction lies in memory, not the battlefield. The remembrance commandment embodies the eternal principle. As Rabbi Sacks explains25, it signifies that irrational hatred—like antisemitism—persists across generations. Reuven Kimelman further demonstrates that the Torah frames Amalek as a symbol of faltering faith: Israel prevails only when Moses’ hands are raised in Emunah (faith). Symbolism is not evasion but the plain sense of these otherwise baffling texts.26
In Judaism, Amalek became the archetype of gratuitous evil and the evil inclination within each of us, as Rabbi Levi Yitzchok of Berditchev explains, whom we must confront. War, except in self-defense, no longer takes place on the battlefield; it becomes a struggle within the soul.27 And we continue remembering this through Parshat Zachor before Purim, recalling the commandment to remember Amalek.
The Canaanite nations present a fundamentally different challenge. Where Amalek embodies irrational hatred requiring eternal symbolic remembrance, the Canaanites represent destructive cultural practices that threatened the moral foundation of Israelite society.
The Canaanite Nations: Culture, Not Race
The prohibition against the Canaanite nations was never racial but cultural. The proof is compelling.
First, given the patriarchal ancient world, when nations were prohibited from converting, the ban applied only to men, not women. Hence, Ruth—the biblical prototype for conversion and ancestor to King David—was from a “forbidden” nation. The problem wasn’t racial identity.28
Second, after Sennacherib’s conquest, forcibly mixed populations, the Rabbis accepted even male converts claiming descent from proscribed nations. Racial identity was of no consequence. Once these nations had been undermined as cultural forces, any biblical prohibition on entering the Jewish people lost its force.29 The Talmud records: “Sisera’s descendants taught children [Torah] in Jerusalem.”30 Even someone with a direct line to the Canaanite nations would not be harmed—they no longer represent a cultural threat.
Maimonides explains that the reason for war against the Canaanites was their idolatry in the land and the cultural practices it generated—child sacrifice, temple prostitution, assaults on human dignity. Once they abandon these practices and accept the seven Noahide laws, war becomes forbidden.31 Both Maimonides and Nachmanides ruled that if any city from the seven nations accepted these basic moral standards, we were required to call for peace, just like any other nation.32
The goal was establishing a moral community based on ethical monotheism, not ethnic warfare.
The Question of Collateral Harm
Biblical warfare included humanitarian requirements that shaped who faced combat. Jewish law mandated leaving escape corridors on three sides of any besieged city, allowing civilians to flee before military action commenced. Maimonides codifies this: “When siege is laid to a city to capture it, it may not be surrounded on all four sides, but only on three, in order to give an opportunity to flee and to anyone who wishes to escape for his life”.33 Nachmanides explains this reflects both practical military strategy and moral imperative—giving those who wish to avoid conflict the opportunity to do so.34
Those who remained after escape routes were provided often chose to stay and may have been combatants or willing participants in their society’s defense. In cases like Midian, where women actively participated in plots to corrupt Israelites through seduction and idolatry (Numbers 25, 31), those who remained represented committed hostile elements.35
From warfare and communal identity, we turn to economic inequality and servitude. If previous cases addressed conflict with external groups, the slavery laws reveal how the Torah addresses internal economic disparities and the treatment of those who become dependent.
Hebrew Slavery: Rehabilitation and Protection
The Sages taught, “Whoever acquires a slave acquires a master for himself,”36 highlighting a central principle: unlike other ancient legal codes, the Torah protected the dignity and welfare of slaves, especially Hebrew slaves.
A Hebrew slave was never sold in a public marketplace but through a private arrangement between the court and the buyer. He could not be assigned degrading labor; his work had to be comparable to that of free people. The master was required to provide equal food and drink, ensuring the slave’s conditions matched those of his master.37
Entry into Hebrew slavery was limited to two circumstances. The court could sell a person to repay what he had stolen, but only if he had no money to do so; minor debts or penalties did not qualify. Voluntary sale was permitted only as a last resort, when the person had nothing left, not even food.38 Protections included a six-year maximum term, family support (even for free wives and children), work limitations, early release options, and a departure bonus (ha’anakah).39
This framework provided an alternative to incarceration, which often harms moral development and leaves families without support.40 Justice was served toward the theft victim, and the slave received care, making Hebrew slavery akin to “community service with a probation officer.”
Although a slave lost full liberty, he remained a full member of the community; only his time and labor were acquired, and it was forbidden to harm him. Yet the Torah did not celebrate even this protective institution. The law that permits one to remain beyond the six-year term reveals discomfort: “You shall bore his ear with an awl... and he shall serve you forever” (Exodus 21:6). Rashi explains the ear was chosen because “It heard at Sinai: ‘For the children of Israel are servants to Me’—they are My servants, not servants to servants—yet this person acquired a master for himself.”
The very permanence available in Hebrew slavery points beyond itself to a higher ideal: that no person should be permanently subject to another. Even as the law creates a protective framework, it gestures toward freedom as the ultimate goal.
Non-Jewish Slavery: Protection and Education Within Ancient Realities
The Torah does not abolish slavery outright; rather, it sets a moral path for human development. The Exodus tells the story of a God who hears the cries of slaves and liberates them, alongside the declaration that every human being is created in the image of God—principles that undermine systems of slavery. At the same time, the Torah establishes minimum standards for ethical conduct. As Maimonides reminds us, “It is according to the nature of man impossible for him suddenly to discontinue everything to which he has been accustomed.”41 Morality is eternal, but its implementation must navigate the ethical realities of the times. This guidance applies to both Hebrew and non-Jewish forms of servitude.
Ancient Realities and Torah’s Response
Rav Kook explains that as long as poverty persists, some form of servitude remains inevitable. The wealthy employ the poor for difficult or degrading labor—what he calls “natural slavery.”42 In 19th-century mining villages, workers faced 16-hour days with negligible wages. When owners chose between mine safety, oxygen, or profit, profit came first. Tens of thousands died.43 Even today, sadly, foreign workers face exploitation because they’re disposable.44
To prevent such exploitation, the Torah defines a status where workers are considered the master’s property—thus harming their health directly harms the master financially, giving him an incentive to invest in their welfare. Additionally, laws restrain the institution and protect the slave.
The Torah’s intent was never that we seize free people. Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch notes that slavery among Jews existed only because it was the world’s way. “A Jew may only buy a non-Jewish slave if he was already a slave according to the law of nations, which rules out buying a free person.”45 The Torah states: ‘It is from the nations around you that you may acquire them’ (Leviticus 25:44)—you may buy them, but not take or enslave them by force.
The Educational Path
Here, the Torah’s approach becomes distinctive. A non-Jewish slave entering a Jewish household doesn’t merely change masters—he enters a process of transformation. Upon purchase, he undergoes circumcision and immersion for the purpose of servitude. During this period, he observes mitzvot like a Jewish woman does—obligated in negative commandments and time-independent positive commandments, participating in Jewish life while not yet fully Jewish. He has left the status of a non-Jew but has not yet become a full member of the Jewish people.46
The master bears responsibility not only to care for and support his slave, but to educate him in Torah values and practice.47 As Even Ha’Ezel explains, the master must ensure the slave knows what is permitted and forbidden—teaching him gradually according to his level and readiness. This education is practical and moral, tailored to guide him toward greater understanding and ethical development.48
Among other nations, slavery was handled harshly. The Code of Hammurabi states that if a slave says to his master, “You are not my master,” his ear shall be cut off 49. Cicero describes how Romans commonly cut out slaves’ tongues if they knew evidence against their masters.50 Such cruelty was standard.51
Rabbi Shmuel Rubenstein argues in Kadmoniot Ha-halakha that awareness of ancient slavery practices reveals how the Torah’s regulations were a tacit rejection of the entire institution.52
In Jewish law, though strict measures existed, they were framed as educational tools—accustoming a lazy slave to discipline, or leaving him to find his own food to learn responsibility. Even striking a slave is understood in this context, like “he who spares the rod hates his son.”53 However, halakha imposes clear limits: if the master causes permanent injury—even knocking out a tooth—the Torah requires releasing the slave immediately as a penalty, deterring abuse.54
As Rav Kook wrote: “Excessive education, beyond what is appropriate to the soul’s state, may sharpen a person, but will not change his essential character.”55 The process cannot be forced. Once the master gauges that the slave is ready and genuinely desires to embrace Judaism, he may—and should—free him. Upon emancipation, the slave undergoes a second immersion, this time to complete his conversion and become a full Jew.56 The Talmud records rabbis freeing slaves even to complete a minyan, demonstrating that once moral readiness is evident, freedom becomes not just possible but praiseworthy—even for rabbinic mitzvot, not only biblical commandments.57
The emancipation question reveals a paradox58: the Torah’s reservations about slavery create an initial restriction on freedom, since coerced conversion is unthinkable. The slave cannot simply be released into society without preparation. Yet once his character develops through education and he genuinely wishes to join the Jewish people, freedom becomes the goal—completing the transformation the Torah always intended.
Beyond the Legal Minimum
Jewish law establishes legal minimums, but ethical ideals push us further. Slavery laws distinguish between Hebrew and non-Jewish slaves, yet this does not permit harsh treatment of non-Jewish slaves; such treatment is forbidden by other laws. As Maimonides explains, this prohibition reflects our obligation to imitate God, who is merciful in all His ways.59
Maimonides emphasizes the higher standard: “Although it is permissible to work a Canaanite slave harshly, the way of piety and wisdom is to be merciful, not overly burdening or distressing him.” Early Sages fed their slaves and animals before themselves, avoided humiliating or shouting at them, and spoke gently while listening to grievances.
He anchors this in Job’s example: “Have I ever shunned justice for my slave and maid-servant… Did not He who made me in the belly make him?” This illustrates a fundamental principle: all humans share a divine origin and deserve fairness and respect. Cruelty and arrogance are found only among idol-worshippers, while Abraham’s descendants are merciful.
By emulating God’s mercy— ”His mercies are upon all of His works… And whoever shows mercy to others will have mercy shown to him”—humans fulfill the Torah’s higher ethical ideal, going beyond what the law merely permits. Law sets the minimum; divine attributes set the aspiration.
Returning to Our Framework
In each of these six cases, the Torah confronts human weakness while pointing toward a higher truth. The rebellious son transforms punishment into a lesson on education and repentance. The captive woman restrains desire amid the chaos of war, preserving dignity where it is most threatened. Amalek becomes not a call to annihilation but a call to eternal vigilance against irrational hatred. The Canaanite nations shift the focus from race to culture, requiring the rejection of destructive practices rather than identities. Hebrew slavery offers protection and rehabilitation, while the pierced ear ritual points beyond servitude toward freedom. Non-Jewish slavery sets protective minimums and an educational path, planting seeds for eventual emancipation and equality.
These six cases reveal the Torah’s method for confronting humanity’s hardest realities. Each sets protective minimums while pointing beyond them to higher ideals. Each embodies the Torah’s dual voice: the law that grounds us in moral duty, and the aspiration that summons us to divine likeness.
The discomfort we feel when reading these passages is itself evidence of moral progress. The Torah planted seeds—the Exodus story, the creation of all humans in God’s image, the command to love the stranger, even the troubling ritual of the pierced ear—that would only bear fruit centuries later in the recognition of universal human dignity and freedom.
As Rabbi Jonathan Sacks observed, “Religions, especially religions of the book, have hard texts. Verses, commandments, episodes, narratives that, if understood literally and applied directly, would not merely offend our moral sense. They would also go against our best understanding of religion itself.”60
The conversation between divine morality and human ethics continues. We remain responsible partners in that ongoing dialogue—reading with the sophistication the Torah demands, distinguishing baseline protections from aspirational callings, applying meta-halakhic principles, and recognizing that the hardest passages often contain the deepest teachings.
In my next essay, I will explore Judaism and women, examining the role of women in Jewish life, law, and tradition.
David Raitan. “Is the Torah Ethical?” Substack, July 29, 2025.
David Raitan. “The Dynamic Balance of Torah and Ethics” Substack, Aug 31, 2025.
Sefer HaChinuch, Mitzvah 248; Mishnah, Sanhedrin 8:2; Maimonides (Rambam), Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Mamrim 7;
Jonathan Sacks, Essays on Ethics: A Weekly Reading of the Jewish Bible, Covenant & Conversation (Jerusalem: Maggid Books, 2016), introduction.
Sifrei Devarim §218:4–9; Mishnah, Sanhedrin 8:5.
On the fact that the parents can forgive their child, preventing the punishment: Babylonian Talmud, Sotah 25a. On the resemblance of Ben Sorer u-Moreh’s parents: Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 70a–71a; Ya’ir Tzangan, Derush u-Kabel Sachar, Kuntres 38 (2018), 70a–71a: if they are equal in voice—i.e., if the father has the voice of a woman, this is a sign of a “castrate,” and if the mother has the voice of a man, this is a sign of an “aylonit,” and in either case they cannot procreate. See also Binyamin Ilani, “Normal, Too Normal: On the Character of Ben Sorer u-Moreh,” Kuntres 38 (2018).
Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 70a–71a; As of Rabbi Yonatan’s statement that he “sat on his grave” raises four difficulties. First, as a Kohen, he would normally be restricted in contact with graves, though some proximity may be permitted. Second, he lived long after capital punishment for dinei nefashot had effectively ceased, making it historically implausible that he encountered a fully executed Ben Sorer u-Moreh. Third, he is the only source reporting that he saw both the rebellious son and the city destroyed for idolatry, yet it seems unlikely that he alone would have witnessed such major events. Fourth, as Rabbi Akiva Eiger notes, Jewish law prohibits sitting on graves (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 364:1; see also Rabbenu Bachya on Devarim 21:21; Rabbi Akiva Eiger, glayon ha-Shas on Sanhedrin 71a).
Rabbenu Bachya offers a resolution: he suggests that Rabbi Yonatan may not have meant the cases literally. The Ben Sorer u-Moreh could symbolize a rebellious figure, akin to Absalom, or a youth who might have benefited from better guidance, while the destroyed city could be metaphorical. In this way, the text serves as a moral or pedagogical illustration, harmonizing with halachic and historical realities.
Mishnah Makkot 1:10
Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 70a–71a.
Moshe Halbertal, Mahapakhot Parshaniyot BeHitavutam (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1999), 46–67; Yair Tzanger, Derush ve-Kabel Sachar, Kuntres 38 (2018), Ben Sorer u-Moreh, Sanhedrin 64a–64b;
Elian Herrera, Shadows of War: Exploring Vietnamese Sexploitation and Its Persistence in Contemporary Society (SUNY Geneseo Honors Thesis, 2021); Elisabeth Jean Wood, Rape as a Practice of War: Toward a Typology of Political Violence (UN report / Politics & Society, 2018); Valerie Wieskamp, Sexual Assault and the My Lai Massacre: The Erasure of Sexual Violence from Public Memory of the Vietnam War (conference paper, 2015); Madi Gilkes, Missing from History: The Other Prisoners of War, Trouble & Strife, Issue 41, Summer 2000.
Yuki Tanaka, “War, Rape and Patriarchy: The Japanese Experience,” Asia-Pacific Journal, 2019; C. N. Morrison, The Whispered Crimes of Sexual Violence in the European Theater of World War II, 2024; Inger Skjelsbæk, The Political Psychology of War Rape: Studies from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012.
Ramban on Devarim 21:17; Talmud Yerushalmi, Makkot 2:6:2–7; Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin 21b.
Ramban, Devarim 21:11–14; Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, Part 3, Chapter 41.
Sifrei Devarim §213 explains that the soldier removes the captive woman’s alluring clothing because, in times of war, the Canaanites dressed their daughters to entice.
Sefer HaChinuch, Mitzvah 244, on wiping out Amalek physically; Mitzvah 243, on remembering Amalek’s evil deeds; Mitzvah 245, on not forgetting what Amalek did to Israel, Parashat Zachor.
Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Kings and Wars, Chapters 5–6.
Deuteronomy 25; Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, Covenant & Conversation: Ki Teitse, Two Types of Hate, 5771.
Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, Covenant & Conversation: Ki Teitse, Two Types of Hate, 5771; Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, Covenant & Conversation: Essays on Ethics, Beshallach, The Face of Evil, 5775.
Reuven Kimelman, “Israel’s Election and the Moral Dilemma of Amalek,” in Judaism’s Challenge: Election, Divine Love, and Human Enmity, ed. Alon Goshen-Gottstein (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2020), 153–154, discussing I Samuel 15 and I Samuel 30:1–2.
Reuven Kimelman, Israel’s Election and the Moral Dilemma of Amalek, 153–154.
Avnei Nezer, Orach Chaim, 2:508. He also argues against any notion that the provision of Deuteronomy 24:16 applies only to Jews.
Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Kings and Wars, Chapters 5–6; Mishneh Torah, Forbidden Intercourse 12:25;
Babylonian Talmud, Gittin 57b
Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, Covenant & Conversation: Ki Teitse, Two Types of Hate, 5771; Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, Covenant & Conversation: Essays on Ethics, Beshallach, The Face of Evil, 5775.
Exodus 17:12; on Amalek read Samuel Lebens, On Being Chosen, Lesson 5: “Amalek,” November 13, 2023
Levi Yitzhak of Berdichev, Kedushat Levi (Jerusalem, 2001), section on Purim.
Mishnah Yevamot 12:3; Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 76b.
Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 28a; Gittin 57b.
Babylonian Talmud, Gittin 57b
Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, Part I, Chapter 49.
Nachmanides, Commentary on Deuteronomy, 20:10; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Kings and Wars, Chapter 6, Laws 1–5.
Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Kings and Wars, Chapter 6, Law 7.
Nachmanides, Sefer ha-Mitzvot, Positive Commandment 5.
Under IHL, combatant status extends beyond front-line fighters to include anyone actively supporting military operations, including logistics and supply roles. Jewish law parallels this: the Mishnah (Sotah 8:7) rules that in a commanded war, “even a groom from his room and a bride from her canopy” must go. Rashash interprets this to include women cooking and baking for soldiers, and Tiferet Yisrael adds, “even to supply food or repair roads.” David, as a youth, served in this capacity (1 Samuel 17:17–18). Thus, women and children engaged in war support may also be considered combatants.
Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin 22a.
Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Slaves, Chapters 1–3.
ibid
ibid
Public Safety Canada, The Effect of Prison on Criminal Behavior, Research Summary Vol. 4 No. 6 (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, November 1999)
Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, Book 3, Chapter 32.
Igrot HaRa’ayah, Vol. I, Letters 89–93.
Amnesty International. “South Korea: Migrant workers treated as ‘disposable labour.’” October 21, 2009.
Canada: Temporary visa programme enables abuse migrant workers, treating them as disposable, report finds — Amnesty International, 2025.
Samson Raphael Hirsch, Commentary on Exodus, 12:44.
Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Slaves, Chapter 8, Law 12.
Oren Avitzur, “Can the Rabbi Say to a Slave, ‘Do This for Me and I Will Not Forsake You’?: On Clarifying the Ethics of Slavery,” Gulot 4 (Yeshivat Atniel, 2000).
Even HaEzel, commentary on Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Slaves, Chapter 8, Law 18.
The Code of Hammurabi, circa 1754 BCE, Law 205; see also Laws 196–197.
Kadmoniot Ha-Halakha, Chapter 22; on non-Jewish slavery read Samuel Lebens, On Being Chosen, Lesson 4: “Non-Jewish Slaves,” November 1, 2023,
ibid
ibid
Book of Proverbs 13:24.
Exodus 21:26; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Slaves, Chapter 5, Law 5;
Igrot HaRa’ayah, Letter 86.
E. Leigh Gibson, The Jewish Manumission Inscriptions of the Bosporus Kingdom (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999).
Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 44b.
Rabbi Nachum Rabinovitch, Pathways to their Hearts: Torah Perspectives on the Individual (Jerusalem: Maggid Books and Me’aliyot Press, 2023), p. 42.
Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Slaves, Chapter 9, Law 8.
Jonathan Sacks, Not in God’s Name: Confronting Religious Violence (New York: Schocken Books, 2015), 219.
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